Abstract: Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favoured by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who are well off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice, and (2) its silence on the question of whether to allocate assistance to those who are badly off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice. In this new light, the benefiting view is harder to justify.
4 loss suffered by another. 4 However, this broader version of the benefiting view will still assign obligations to the beneficiaries of injustice (at least on the assumption, which I will make, that the injustice inflicts a loss on someone). I will therefore focus specifically on cases of benefiting from injustice, as it is in these cases that all benefiting-type views assign special obligations to beneficiaries. Second, I will treat 'injustice' and its cognates in a technical sense, as necessarily resulting from a wrongful act. On some views, including luck egalitarianism, injustice might arise without any wrongdoing. As most advocates of the benefiting view would not assign obligations to those who benefit from such 'cosmic injustice', it is convenient for presentational purposes to use injustice in a more restricted, agential sense. Nothing substantive follows from this (indeed, I present reasons for favouring luck egalitarianism).
The Standard Case
Miller describes a case in which A steals a drug from P to save Q's life, at some cost to P, who needs the drug but with less urgency. According to Miller, A 'has a remedial responsibility to P to replace what he has taken'. 5 The idea here is that those who are responsible for harming another acquire the special obligation to remedy the harm.
Bashshar Haydar argues that the 'benefiting factor' provides a further basis for allocating special obligations. Of the 'Drug Case', Haydar comments that '[i]t seems plausible to maintain that Q, being the beneficiary of P's loss, has special responsibility 5 to compensate P'. 6 He also describes a second case, the 'Gift Case', which involves Oliver stealing Daniella's car and consequently giving his old car to Heloise. Again, Haydar thinks '[i]t seems plausible to maintain that Heloise acquires some degree of special responsibility to compensate at least for part of Daniella's loss on the basis of being a beneficiary of that loss '. 7 Daniel Butt suggests the following example to motivate the idea that benefiting from injustice gives rises to special obligations to remedy a bad situation. Neither A nor B are causally or morally responsible for C's plight, nor are there relevant communal ties. Thus, among Miller's grounds for special responsibility, only capacity remains, and so A, who has 700kg of crop to B's 400kg, appears to bear most of the special responsibility. Butt asks 'does not such a conclusion seem intuitively objectionable? … In this case, D's actions conferred benefits upon B. Should we not hold 6 that B's improved position, which has come about as a direct result of C's worsened position, constitutes just the sort of "morally relevant relation" between parties which might be considered when we ask who should bear remedial responsibilities'. 7 from injustice as a ground for special responsibility suggest that the relevant reason is that B's position has been reached, in part, at C's expense. He does not consider another reason one might have for thinking it important that 'B's improved position … has come about as a direct result of C's worsened position'. This is the fact that B has benefited, and C lost out, without having brought about the events that caused the respective benefit and loss. After all, the benefit and the loss resulted from D's actions, which neither B nor C were aware of and for which they are certainly not responsible. In Ronald Dworkin's well-known terms, B has good brute luck, and C has bad brute luck, as they have been subject to the upshot of risk which they did not deliberately take on. 11 As subsequent 'luck egalitarian' writers such as Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen suggest, the effects of brute luck should be undone in the name of securing equal opportunity for welfare or access to advantage. 12 There is thus a second, luck egalitarian ground for establishing that B has a special obligation to assist C. This ground is that B is better off than C as a matter of brute luck. To put the point another way, those with good brute luck relative to others should be assigned special obligations.
I likewise agree with Haydar that '[i]t seems plausible to maintain that Q … has special responsibility to compensate P', and that 'Heloise acquires some degree of special 14 A referee notes a complication here: 'Suppose that Heloise has been courting Oliver (whom she dislikes)
for the sole purpose of receiving gifts from him in cases such as the one at hand. Then her benefit is a matter of option luck, not brute luck'. In reply, I maintain that any plausible luck egalitarian view will (1) deny that Oliver acquires any entitlement to Daniella's car by stealing it, and therefore (2) deny that it is a matter of good option luck for Daniella that she receives the car. Regarding (1), it is obvious that luck egalitarianism will need to rule out individuals benefiting themselves through theft or fraud, either by building this into the principles themselves (for instance, by assessing the moral, social, or desert value of choices) or by combining their principles with others that provide these prohibitions. In respect of (2) 17 Robert Fullinwider suggests that there is a weaker case for special obligations grounded in benefiting from injustice where the benefit was received involuntary ('Preferential Hiring and Compensation', Social Theory and Practice 3 (1975), 307-320, 317) . Haydar proposes that the case is weaker where it would have been permissible to accept the benefit were one aware of the full facts, and where the injustice was not motivated by the benefit to a third party ('Special Responsibility and the Appeal to Cost', 143). However, both of my examples can be revised such that (1) the beneficiary voluntarily receives the benefit, (2) it would have been impermissible for the beneficiary to accept the benefit were she aware of the full facts (which she is not), and (3) the wrongdoer did not intend to benefit the beneficiary. For instance, the beneficiary may have taken up an unjustly-sacked person's job, or moved into an apartment when the previous occupant had to move after losing money in a swindle (see Reitberger, 'Poverty, Negative Duties, and the Global Institutional Order', 398). The plausibility of the benefiting from injustice ground for special obligations in my examples is thus not affected by the factors Fullinwider and Haydar mention.
Non-Standard Cases
First consider a case which introduces Bystander, who is as well off as Beneficiary, but not as the result of anybody's unjust actions or anybody's loss. Bystander has, however, benefited from brute luck to the same extent as Beneficiary. Perhaps she has special natural talents of exactly the same value as the injustice-generated benefits received by
Beneficiary. In short, Beneficiary and Bystander are identical, except that Beneficiary's advantages came about through a process which unjustly harmed another while
Bystander's did not. Call the non-standard case involving Victim, Beneficiary, and Bystander the Bystander Case.
As Bystander has not benefited from injustice, if benefiting from injustice gives rise to special obligations, Bystander will not have the special obligations that Beneficiary has. By contrast, if good brute luck gives rise to special obligations,
Bystander and Beneficiary will have identical special obligations, as they have benefited equally from brute luck. Bystander has had the good brute luck of high native talent, while Beneficiary has had the good brute luck of benefiting from injustice. Thus, the first respect in which the benefiting view differs from luck egalitarianism is that it is silent on It seems to be agreed that, if Beneficiary has special obligations on the basis that he has benefited from injustice, they are special obligations to assist Victim in particular.
They are what I will call interpersonal obligations -obligations that fall on one individual, to assist another specific individual. I have already quoted Butt's suggestion that there is a 'morally relevant relation' between B (the beneficiary) and C (the victim),
as well as Haydar's remarks that 'Q, being the beneficiary of P's loss, has special responsibility to compensate P' and 'that Heloise acquires some degree of special responsibility to compensate at least for part of Daniella's loss on the basis of being a beneficiary of that loss'. Other adherents of the view that benefiting from injustice may give rise to special obligations likewise explicitly claim that such obligations are interpersonal. 18 None seem to countenance the notion that the special obligation people in the position of Beneficiary acquire is to assist the worse off more generally. 
Justifications of the Benefiting View
The benefiting view is distinguished from luck egalitarianism by its silence in the thinks it analogous to one in which 'A pays B $100, thinking she owes B the $100 when in fact she does not'. In such a case, the legal principle of unjust enrichment requires that B repays the $100 'even though B is innocent of any wrongdoing. It is sufficient that B acquired wealth to which she is not entitled'. 26 But the notion of entitlement in play here, which is the one (implicitly) appealed to in the supposedly moralized version of the principle of unjust enrichment, is simply that actually manifested in the law. We have been given no reason to suppose that the present system of property rights is a just one. Individuals are entitled to any holdings acquired in accordance with the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer; holdings not acquired in these ways are subject to rectification. The benefiting view could be defended as (part of) a libertarian account of 27 Ed Page suggests that the 'unjust factor' in prior activities can be defined on the basis of the harm caused, the development constrained, or the common property trespassed upon ('Give it up for Climate Change', 314-316). This approach is more promising in that it acknowledges that entitlements must be established on an overtly moral basis if the unjust enrichment justification is to have traction. But Page explicitly does not defend any one of the three definitions of the unjust factor, so it is hard to assess whether his view, in any of its versions (see also 'Climatic Justice and the Fair Distribution of Atmospheric Burdens: A Conjunctive Account', 420-424), might uphold the benefiting view. I do, however, consider a close relative of the 'common property' approach in the next sub-section. One last way of combining libertarianism and the benefiting view was put to me by a referee, who urged that 'we might maintain that injustice automatically undercuts entitlement. It then follows that if A violated B's rights and in so doing bestowed a benefit on C, then the post-violation pattern of holdings simply does not respect principles of justice in acquisition and transfer'. The idea, as I understand it, is to specify that injustice-derived benefits necessarily violate libertarian principles, so the internal problem does not arise. This response does not, of course, address the external problem, and is less effective than it seems regarding the internal problem. While it might be true that beneficiaries have no libertarian entitlements where they have directly benefited from injustice (as where A took B's wallet, and gave it to C), this is less plausible in the many cases in which the beneficiaries benefit less directly. For instance, Haydar mentions a case in which 'country A unjustifiably invaded country B and destroyed its oil producing facilities. Suppose that this has led to higher oil prices which in turn benefited C, another oil producing country'. 34 It seems clearly contrary to libertarian principles to maintain that C has no entitlement to the increased oil income. Benefiting theorists might 19 respond by holding that these less direct cases of benefiting from injustice do not call for redress. But in that case, the onus is on them to explain exactly why this is the case, and in a way that is compatible with libertarianism. To date, that has not been attempted.
Free-riding.
The final justification to be considered has been developed by Axel
Gosseries. According to Gosseries, I free-ride where '(1) another person's action (2) benefits me (3) while the costs involved in it are being more than proportionately covered by other people (i.e. the author and/or third parties)'. 35 In his (deliberately simplified) example, if (1) the US's carbon emissions (2) benefit the EU through trade, and (3) anthropogenic climate change damages fall disproportionately on Bangladesh, the EU free rides with respect to Bangladesh. While Gosseries intends only to justify the Standard Claim, the argument might be extended to cover the Bystander and Unfortunate
Cases. Beneficiary would seem to be a free-rider, as she has benefited from Wrongdoer's actions, which have disproportionate cost for Victim. Bystander is not a free-rider, as she has benefited from nobody's costly actions. Thus, free-riding may seem to justify the difference of obligations between Beneficiary and Bystander that the benefiting view assigns. That view's differential treatment of Victim and Unfortunate may be justified on a similar basis, as Victim's disadvantage is connected to the benefit of a free-rider (Beneficiary), but Unfortunate's disadvantage is not.
For the free-riding justification to work, we need to be given reasons for thinking that free-riders are under obligations that those who have received similar benefits, but not as the result of another's cost-imposing action, are not. In real world cases, there are 20 often efficiency reasons for putting disincentives on free-riding. For instance, a public transport system may be highly beneficial to a city, but unsustainable if there are too many fare dodgers. But that kind of consideration is inapplicable here, as the beneficiary view is supposed to apply even if there are no incentive effects.
Gosseries recognizes the importance of providing a deeper justification, writing that 'free-riding based claims need to be located among other justice-based claims'. 36 He suggests that it might be supported either on a distributive justice basis or an 'interactive (or rectificatory) justice' basis. However, the benefiting view's treatment of the Bystander and Unfortunate Cases clearly cannot be supported in either of these ways.
Gosseries' distributive justice argument is that free-riding might be viewed as falling within the purview of the principle that 'all disadvantages resulting from circumstances (natural events or involuntary human actions) that were imposed should be compensated'. 37 This principle in essence expresses luck egalitarianism. While Gosseries is correct that it supports the Standard Claim, I think he would agree that it is at odds with the benefiting view in the Bystander and Unfortunate Cases, where it allows disadvantages of circumstance. The same is true of the interactive justice argument, which applies where benefiting is viewed as an action rather than a circumstance (as where Beneficiary and Bystander actively claim their benefits). Gosseries understands interactive justice 'as a way of rectifying unfair departures from the baseline situation resulting from the implementation of distributive justice'. where that is stipulated to be luck egalitarian.
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In sum, the free-rider justification is, like the unjust enrichment and libertarian justifications, itself reliant for its appeal on deeper moral positions. These are, to date, either undefended, or unable to support the benefiting view's treatment of the Bystander and Unfortunate Cases.
Objections to the Benefiting View
No satisfactory justification for the benefiting view's distinctive features has been found.
Even so, from what has been said so far, we have been given no grounds for rejecting the benefiting view in favour of luck egalitarianism or some other view. Perhaps the benefiting view's treatment of the Bystander and Unfortunate Cases is a benign feature of an otherwise attractive view. In this section I present reasons for thinking that this is not so.
39 Anwander develops the free-riding justification in a different way, focusing on moral free-riding, which 'occurs when someone benefits from another person's wrongful action, from situations of injustice, or generally from what is morally unacceptable, without covering some appropriate share of the moral costs' 185 ). Yet we need to be given reasons for thinking that moral free-riders are under special obligations that non-moral free riders lack, just as we did when considering
Gosseries' conventional free-riders. Anwander does not provide an explanation here, and the kind of distributive or interactional justice explanation Gosseries provided would work no better as regards the Subsistence. As in the Bystander Case, there is in the Unfortunate Case an inequality generated that has no justification from the choices the individuals concerned have made.
Unfortunate is, after Victim is compensated, worse off than Victim just because she had the bad luck to be struck by a lack of talent rather than injustice. However, the Unfortunate Case brings to the fore a further unattractive feature of the benefiting view.
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Not assisting Unfortunate may well mean that she is at the level of subsistence rather than much higher. 42 The benefiting view allows this even where Unfortunate and Victim could 41 In principle, this feature might arise in the Bystander Case. This is, however, less likely in the typical contexts in which the benefiting view is invoked (see the next subsection).
42 Strictly speaking, the benefiting view would allow even that above-subsistence aid to Victim be prioritized over bringing Unfortunate up to the level of subsistence. But this is an uncharitable interpretation as most of those who propose the benefiting view assume that assisting the very badly off gets priority. For instance, Butt focuses on the duties of those 'benefiting from the plight of those in desperate need' ('On Benefiting from Injustice', 130), while Haydar opens his article by saying that 'there both be brought well above the level of subsistence. It would, for instance, insist on $20,000 per year for Victim and $10,000 per year for Unfortunate, rather than $15,000
per year for both, where Beneficiary receives $10,000 per year of benefit from some injustice perpetrated on Victim, and Victim and Unfortunate will have $10,000 per year if
Beneficiary does not assist them. To leave someone much worse off than another, and at a low absolute level, on account of differential brute luck, is counterintuitive.
The benefiting theorist might reply by saying that, if we are concerned by how badly off Unfortunate may be in absolute terms, the solution is just to raise the subsistence threshold below which no one may fall. But insofar as this response succeeds in making the view under consideration plausible, it does so by reducing the role of the benefiting-focused part of the view. Furthermore, the higher the subsistence threshold, the less plausible it is that benefits should not be conditional. As Arneson has written, 'some individuals might behave culpably irresponsibly, again and again, so that the cost of maintaining them at the guaranteed threshold level becomes prohibitive, or swallows up all social resources'. 43 A high subsistence threshold objectionably allows individuals to engage in the kind of 'moral hostage-taking' usually associated with the expensive tastes objection to equality of welfare. 44 The subsistence problem arises from the conjunction of (1) individuals being reduced to a low absolute level and (2) this being are extremely undesirable conditions in our world today' and 'it is extremely important that something should be done to alleviate these conditions' (Haydar, 'Special Responsibility and the Appeal to Cost', 144 I have argued that the Standard Case favoured by those who endorse the view that benefiting from injustice gives rise to special obligations supports a luck egalitarian view to the same extent. The benefiting view is distinguished from luck egalitarianism by (1) its silence on the question of whether those who are well off but not as a result of injustice should be assigned special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off, and (2) its silence on the question of whether those who are badly off but not as a result of injustice should be assisted. Finding that there are no successful justifications of this stance, and that it is subject to important theoretical and practical objections, I conclude that luck egalitarianism is a more plausible view. If that is right, it becomes less pressing to identify those who have benefited and lost out from the historical and ongoing injustices associated with globalization and climate change, and more pressing to identify those who are advantaged or disadvantaged by differential brute luck, whether it by acts of injustice or natural misfortune.
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